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Abstract. This paper examines the effect of bank concentration on the non-performing 
loans (NPLs) for ten Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The short-run effect 
of bank concentration is tested with the generalised method of moments system and the 
instrumental variable approaches, and the long-run effect is tested with the fully modified 
ordinary least square (FMOLS) approach. The empirical analysis shows that the bank 
concentration is an insignificant factor on the NPLs, either in the short or in the long-run 
of the panel data set. On the other hand, individual FMOLS results reveal that the bank 
concentration reduces the NPLs in Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia, and increases the NPLs 
in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia in the long-run. According to this 
evidence, the bank concentration does not reduce the credit risk for all of the CEE coun-
tries. Therefore, bank concentration may not affect systemic stability in the CEE countries. 
These findings are also robust in controlling several factors, including additional control 
variables. As a result, the relationship between the bank concentration and the NPLs, in 
regards to the CEE countries, is ambiguous. 
Keywords: bank concentration, non-performing loans, transitional economies, GMM-
systems, instrumental variable, FMOLS.
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Introduction
Macroeconomists paid more attention to the size and overall impact of the financial 
institutions, specifically banks, on the recent financial crises. In an early study, Beck 
et al. (2006, 2007) firstly argued that if the banking system was more concentrated, 
the banking system would be more stable. This is because they found that more con-
centrated systems are much more protected against risk. They defined the systematic 
banking crisis with the ratio of nonperforming loans1. They found that greater bank 
concentration is associated with a lower likelihood of suffering a crisis. Chang et al. 
(2008) and Deltuvaite (2010) also found similar results that bank concentration increas-
1 When the ratio of total non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeds ten percent, or 
when the government has taken extraordinary steps, this situation is defined as a banking crisis.
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es the stability of the banking system and decreases nonperforming loans2. In contrast 
to these findings, several empirical studies have shown that there is no significant cor-
relation between bank concentration and bank stability. Schaeck et al. (2009) tested the 
impact of bank concentration on the likelihood of a systematic crisis by using Panzar 
and Rosse’s (1987) competition measure, h-statistics, in 45 countries. Their findings 
suggest that more competitive banking systems are less prone to experience a systemic 
crisis and exhibit increased time to crises. De Nicolo et al. (2003) used data on the 500 
largest financial firms and large banks in 90 countries in order to test the effect of bank 
concentration on bank stability. They found that highly concentrated banking systems 
have more systematic risk than less concentrated banking systems. 
Ruiz-Porras (2008) studied how competition might affect the bank fragility by using 
logit models3. He found evidence that banking concentration is not a significant de-
terminant for bank stability. These findings contradict the study by Beck et al. (2006), 
which considers banking concentration is an important determinant of banking stability. 
Similar to those findings, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) claimed that if the banking market 
is more concentrated, the risk of failure would increase. Therefore, higher loan rates 
would imply higher bankruptcy risk. Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2009) investigated Eu-
ropean banking systems by using a dataset consisting of 180 commercial banks within 
25 European Union countries. They employed panel probit regression estimates with 
the generalised method of moments approach and found similar results with Boyd and 
De Nicolo’s (2005) findings. They claimed that bank concentration increases the finan-
cial distress for 25 EU countries. 
Some studies show mixed results about the effects of bank concentration on bank sta-
bility. By using data from 23 developed countries, Berger et al. (2009) studied bank 
competition and the financial stability. Their result supports not only the “competition-
fragility” view but also “competition-stability”. They found that banks with a higher 
degree of market power, which occurs in concentrated banking systems, have less over-
all risk exposure. On the other hand, their findings support that market power increases 
loan risk in these countries. Allen and Gale (2004) consider a variety of different mod-
els of competition and bank stability. They analysed the effects of bank concentration 
on bank stability with the general equilibrium models of financial intermediaries and 
markets. They concluded that greater competition in the banking sector may be good 
for efficiency, but may be troubled for financial stability. Finally, Jimenez et al. (2007) 
investigated the effects of bank concentration in the Spanish banking system. They also 
detected mixed results, such as standard measures of market concentration does not 
affect non-performing loans. However, when they used Lerner indexes based on bank-
specific interest rates, they found that the relationship was negative. 
2 Chang et al. (2008) investigated the Brazilian banking system to test the relationship between the 
non-performing loans and the bank concentration, and Deltuvaite (2010) investigated this relationship 
for 160 countries. 
3 Ruiz-Porras (2008) used banking market structure, bank-like institutions, financial structure and 
development variables for 47 countries between 1990 and 1997.
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In the empirical literature, these mixed results can be explained by two views. The first 
view is that the bank concentration may reduce the NPLs by enhancing market power 
and boosting bank profits, so that high profits can provide a “buffer” against adverse 
shocks (Hellman et al. 2000; Matutes, Vives 2000; Allen, Gale 2000; Beck et al. 2006). 
An opposite view can be counted as a more concentrated banking system may lead to 
less credit rationing (Caminal, Matutes 2002; Body, De Nicolo 2005). Since both of the 
views may hold true, the relationship between bank concentration and banking fragility 
can be found as ambiguous. Thus, the long-run effect of bank concentration should also 
be tested for a set of panel countries as well as for individual countries. 
In this paper, the relationship between the bank concentration and the NPLs is investi-
gated for ten CEE countries. These countries are ideal developing countries by which to 
study this issue for three reasons. Firstly, the CEE countries inherited underdeveloped 
and badly managed banks from the past. During the transition, the banking systems un-
derwent a rapid change in these countries. Secondly, these countries experienced several 
banking crises after 1995s4. Thirdly, only very few empirical papers have focussed on 
the determinants of the NPLs while considering the effect of bank concentration in the 
transitional economies. This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature on the effects of 
bank concentration in the CEE countries with the short- and long-run effects. The short-
run effect is tested with the generalised method of moments-system (GMM-system) and 
instrumental variable (IV) approaches, and the long-run effect is tested with the fully 
modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) approach5. The empirical analysis shows that 
the bank concentration is an insignificant factor on the NPLs, in either in the short-run or 
in the long-run for the panel data set. On the other hand, the individual FMOLS results 
show that bank concentration reduces the NPLs in Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia, and 
increases the NPLs in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia. For positive 
effect, a one percentage increase in the bank concentration increases NPLs in the range 
of 0.06–0.86 percentage points, and for negative effect, a one percentage increase in the 
bank concentration reduces NPLs in the range of 0.24–0.34 percentage points. These 
findings are also robust in controlling several factors, including additional control vari-
ables. Regarding to this evidence, the bank concentration does not reduce the credit risk 
for all of the CEE countries, and the relationship between the bank concentration and 
the NPLs is found to be ambiguous in the CEE countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the determinants 
of the NPLs. Section 2 provides the methodologies of the GMM-system, the IV, and 
the FMOLS. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents empirical results on the 
effect of bank concentration, and section 5 presents robustness check. Finally, the last 
section concludes the study.
4 The beginning and ending period of the banking crises in CEE countries as follows (Laeven, Va-
lencia 2010): Bulgaria (1996–1997), Croatia (1997–1998), Czech Republic (1996–2000), Estonia 
(1992–1994), Hungary (1991–1995), Latvia (2008– ...), Lithuania (1995–1996), Poland (1992–1994), 
Slovakia (1998–2002), and Slovenia (1992, 2008–...).
5 If the variables are cointegrated, it is not necessary to check the short-run affects using OLS or other 
methods. In this study, we check the short-run effect as robustness check in the short-run. 
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1. The determinants of NPLs
The first step of the empirical analysis for the link between the bank concentration and 
the NPLs is to determine the control macroeconomic variables that can affect NPLs6. In 
an early study, Keeton and Morris (1987) showed that the economic conditions signifi-
cantly explain the NPLs. Sinkey and Greenwalt (1991) examined the macroeconomic 
factors that explain NPLs in U.S. commercial banks and they found that high interest 
rates, lending rates and volatile funds that have impact on the NPLs. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) investigated the effect of macroeconomic variables on the banking 
crises7. They select GDP growth, terms of trade, changes in foreign exchange rates, 
real interest rates, inflation, and government budget surplus/GDP ratio as the control 
macroeconomic variables. They found that GDP growth has a negative impact, and 
real interest rates and inflation have a positive impact on the NPLs. Salas and Saurina 
(2002) compared the determinants of NPLs for Spanish commercial and savings banks 
and they use both macroeconomic and individual bank level variables, such as GDP 
growth rate, credit or branch expansion, inefficiency, size, net interest margin, capital 
ratio, and market power. Arpa et al. (2001) and Jakubik (2007) focus on developing 
macro models for financial stability purposes. They use GDP growth, nominal interest 
rates, and inflation as explanatory variables relating to the indicator of the NPLs in the 
economy. Louzis et al. (2012) investigated the effect of macro and micro variables on 
the NPLs, and they found that NPLs can be explained mainly by macroeconomic vari-
ables such  as GDP growth, unemployment, and  interest rates. 
Only very few empirical papers have to date focused on the determinants of NPLs in 
transitional economies. Festic and Beko (2008) employed the vector autoregression 
approach for the NPLs dynamics in the five CEE countries and they concluded that 
GDP growth, foreign direct investment growth, real interest rates, and credit growth 
are significant macroeconomic variables. Festic et al. (2009) used panel estimates to 
explain the NPLs, by introducing macroeconomic and banking sector variables. They 
found that credit/asset ratio and gross fixed capital formulation have a positive impact 
on the NPLs, and that deposit/loan ratio, exports of goods and services, real effective 
exchange rate, and long-run (real) interest rates have a negative impact on the NPLs. 
Festic et al. (2011) tested the determinants of the NPLs for the same five CEE countries 
by using instrumental variable (2SLS) approach. Their estimates support the view that 
the growth of credit and amount available to finance may harm banking performance. 
Nkusu (2011) determined the macroeconomic factors that affect NPLs: GDP growth, 
unemployment, changes in house prices, changes in equity prices, inflation, nominal 
effective exchange rates, interest rates, and credit growth. Foos et al. (2010) tested the 
effect of loan growth on the riskiness and profitability of banks in 16 major countries. 
In contrast to previous studies, they found that loan growth has a negative impact on 
the riskiness and profitability of banks. 
6 The NPLs are initially affected by other macroeconomic variables and we should estimate a multiple 
regression where the independent variables are bank concentration and the control macroeconomic 
variables. 
7 One of their definitions of the banking crises is that the ratio of the NPLs in the banking system 
exceeds ten percent.
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The set of macroeconomic determinants of the NPLs consists of gross fixed capital for-
mulation (Gfc), exports of goods and services (Export), official exchange rate growth 
as LCU per US$ (Exchrate), the credit/deposit ratio (Credit/Deposit), unemployment 
rate as a percentage of total labour force (Unemp), the percentage of number of foreign 
banks in the banking system (FBanks); and these variables are in line with Festic et al. 
(2009). Nevertheless, the Unemp instead of interest rates, Credit/Deposit ratio instead 
of credit/asset and deposit/loan ratios are used in this study. The Unemp is one of the 
major determinants of the NPLs, as stated by Nkusu (2011). Credit/Deposit ratio is 
found as a more appropriate control macroeconomic variable, as it represents the us-
age of deposits by the banks. The FBanks ratio is added to control the effect of foreign 
bank entry8 on the NPLs via credit selection performance. To check for potential endo-
geneity of the bank concentration, we also estimate 2SLS regression with a number of 
instrumental variables. Selected instruments should be correlated with the explanatory 
variable and uncorrelated with the error term. Firstly, following Festic et al. (2011) and 
Festic and Kavkler (2012), banking sector development index of European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD Index) is used. Secondly, bank capital to total 
assets ratio (BCap) is selected9. It is expected that an increase in the ERBD index and 
the BCap will effect concentration in the banking sector. Thirdly, following Klomp and 
Haan (2012), economic freedom index of the Fraser institute (Freedom) is used. An 
increase in the Freedom will accelerate competition in the banking sector and this will 
result in diminishing concentration in the banking sector. We also checked that these 
three instruments are not correlated with the dependent variable (NPLs). In our estima-
tion, IV approach will serve a robustness check of the pooled OLS and GMM-systems 
estimations. In addition, the panel data regression with additional control variables is 
tested to find out if the estimated parameters are robust or not. These additional control 
variables are difference between the lending and deposit rates (Spread) which is selected 
as a proxy for interest rate, stock market capitalisation / GDP ratio (Stock), GDP growth 
rate (Gdp), and foreign direct investment to GDP ratio (Fdi)10. It is expected that Spread 
should increase the NPLs as financial burden of the firms increases, and the Stock, the 
GDP, and the Fdi should decrease NPLs as growth and investment strength the firms’ 
operational performance. Our model without additional control variables provided by 
the following function:
/
1 2 3 4 5 6 7, , , , , / , ,NPLs f BankCons Gfc Export Exchrate Unemp Credit Deposit FBanks
+
+ − − − − − −
= β β β β β β β
 
 
 
 
 
where the NPLs is the share of non-performing loans to total bank loans, the BankCons 
  8 Claessens and Laeven (2004) found that greater foreign bank presence can make for more competi-
tive banking systems. 
  9 Festic et al. (2011), Festic and Kavkler (2012) use capital adequacy ratio (measured as capital to 
risk weighted assets). Due to insufficient number of observation, we use capital to total assets ratio 
as a proxy for this variable. 
10 We have small sample (N = 10, T = 10) and there can be degrees of freedom problem with additional 
control variables. Therefore, we check FMOLS results by excluding existing control variables. 
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is the bank concentration ratio measured by the assets share of the three largest banks 
in the total assets of the banking system. A negative relationship between the NPLs 
and the Gfc, the Export, the Exchrate, the FBanks can be expected according to Festic 
et al. (2009), and a positive link between the NPLs and the Unemp can be anticipated 
according to Nkusu (2011). 
2. Methodology 
In this section, the GMM-system, the IV and the FMOLS approaches are clarified. The 
GMM-system and the IV approaches allow us to estimate the short-run effect of the 
bank concentration, whereas the FMOLS allows us to estimate the long-run and indi-
vidual country effect of bank concentration. 
2.1. The short-run panel estimates 
The effect of bank concentration on non-performing loans can be estimated with the 
following panel ordinary least square regression (Pooled OLS):
 0 1( ) ( ) ( ) ,it it k k it itD NPLs D BankCons D x= α + β + β + ε   (1)
where the itNPLs  is non-performing loans in the ith country, the itBankCons  is bank 
concentration; xit is a set of control macroeconomic variables; D(...) is the difference 
in growth rates in each variable, and itε  is the error term. The current year’s non-
performing loans are also dependent on the previous year’s non-performing loans, as 
the banks cannot clear all the non-performing loans in one year. In this case, the lag of 
the dependent variable should be added to regression. The pooled OLS regression has 
potential bias because the previous year’s non-performing loans will be correlated with 
the individual specific effect. Besides, if the variables are cointegrated, short-run affect 
can only be checked using panel vector error correction or dynamic panel data models. 
For this reason, the effect of bank concentration on non-performing loans is tested with 
the dynamic panel data regression based on the GMM-system, which was developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998)11. The dynamic panel data model 
for the effect of bank concentration on the non-performing loans can be defined as:
0 1 ( 1) 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it i t it it itD NPLs D NPLs D BankCons D Gfc D Export−= α + α + β + β + β +  
4 5 6 7( ) ( ) ( / ) ( ) .it it it it itD Exchrate D Unemp D Credit Deposit D FBanksβ + β + β + β ε ,      (2)
in which, D(...) is the difference in growth rates for the GMM-system estimates.
For a robustness check, we estimate panel data regression with the IV approach for 
the short-run effect. An efficient IV for panel data regression model is proposed by 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Anderson and Hsiao (1981)12. We employ the IV with 
panel data proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) by treating bank concentration as 
11 The GMM-system approach produces more efficient dynamic panel data estimators than the GMM 
in differences approach proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) since the GMM-system estimator 
reduces the potential biases arising from the instruments.
12 Blundell and Bond (1998) note that both the GMM-difference and IV estimators suffer from a weak 
instrument problem; therefore, the GMM-system approach is more efficient than these estimators. 
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endogenous variable. The EBRD Index, the BCap, and the Freedom are selected as 
instruments. Stata routine xtivreg213 is applied for the IV with panel data. Over identi-
fication of all instruments is checked with Sargan (1958) test, and the correlation with 
the excluded instruments and the endogenous variable is checked with Anderson (1984) 
canonical correlation likelihood ratio test (Anderson canon. Corr.). 
2.2. The long-run panel estimates 
Prior to the FMOLS test, the long-run equilibrium relationship should be tested with the 
panel cointegration analysis. Pedroni (1999, 2004) considers the following time series:
 0 1 1 , , ,
.... ,it i i t Mi M i t i ty t x x= α + δ + β + + β + ε  (3)
where M is the number of regressors, t is time period, and iα  and iδ  allow for the 
possibility of country specific fixed effects and deterministic trends. Let itε  be the es-
timated residuals, which represents deviations from the long-run relationship. The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is tested with the following regression model: 
 , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .i t i i t i tuε = ρ ε +  (4)
Evidence in favour of cointegration is provided when itε  is found to be stationary. 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) has proposed seven within- and between-dimension-based sta-
tistics with the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The four within-dimension-based 
statistics are the panel u, the panel r, the panel PP, and the panel ADF, which represent 
the non-parametric variance ratio, Student’s t-statistics, Phillips-Perron r (Phillips, Per-
ron 1988), and parametric statistics based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey, Fuller 
1981), respectively. The three between-dimension statistics are the group r, the group 
PP, and the group ADF. These three statistics simply average the individually estimated 
coefficients for each member. The distribution of these panel cointegration statistics are 
asymptotically standard normal, and these tests contain individual specific short-run 
dynamics, individual specific fixed effects-deterministic trends, and individual specific 
slope coefficients. For the between-dimension-based statistics, the null hypothesis is 
1iρ =  against 1iρ = ρ <  for all i, while for the within-dimension-based statistics, the 
null hypothesis is 1iρ =  against 1ρ <  for all i.
Once the panel cointegration is established, the long-run cointegrating coefficients can 
be estimated using the FMOLS approach proposed by Pedroni (2000, 2001)14. Fol-
lowing Pedroni (2000, 2001), the between-dimension FMOLS for the heterogeneous 
cointegrated panel is estimated15. The FMOLS estimator is consistent and efficient, 
even with a small sample size16. This approach also corrects the standard panel OLS 
bias because of the endogeneity and the serial correlation of regressors. Consider the 
following cointegrated system for a panel of i = 1, 2, 3,…, N countries over time t:
13 This routine is developed by Schaffer (2008).
14 Banerjee (1999) states that the FMOLS and DOLS are asymptotically equivalent for more than 60 
observations. This study contains 600 observations in the panel data set.
15 Pedroni (2000) shows that the between-dimension FMOLS is better than the within-dimension 
FMOLS. 
16 Our sample consist of N = 10, and T = 10. 
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 , , , ,
,i t i i t i t i ty x= α + β + µ   (5)
, , 1 ,i t i t i tx x −= + ε
the vector error terms , , ,( , )i t i t i tξ = µ ε  are stationary with an asymptotic covariance 
matrix 'i i iL LΩ = 17, where Li is the lower triangular decomposition of iΩ 18. Thus, the 
variables ,i ty  and ,i tx  are cointegrated for i = 1, 2, 3,…, N, with cointegrating vector 
b. Using this notation, the group-mean panel FMOLS estimator is presented as follows:
 
1
* 1 2 *
, , ,
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ,
N T T
GFM i t i i t i i t i
i t t
N x x x x y T
−
−
= = =
   
β = − − − γ      
   
∑ ∑ ∑  (6)
in which, ix  refers to the individual specific mean, T is the number of sample observations 
over time, 21,*, , , ,
22,
ˆ
( ) ˆ
i
i t i t i t i t
i
y y y x
Ω
= − − ∆
Ω
, and 21,0 021, 22,21, 22,
22,
ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ( )ˆ
i
i i ii i
i
y
Ω
≡ Γ +Ω − Γ +Ω
Ω  
. 
The t-statistics for the group-mean panel FMOLS estimator ( *ˆGFMβ ), based on the be-
tween-dimension of the panel, is given by:
 
( )*
1/2
1/2 * 1 2
, 0 ,11,
1 1
ˆ( ( )
GFM
N T
FM i i t ii
i t
t N x x− −β
= =
 
= β −β Ω −  
 
∑ ∑ , (7)
where * ,FM iβ  is the conventional FMOLS estimator, and *GFMtβ  converges to the standard normal distribution as N →∞  and T →∞ . 
3. Data 
The sample consists of ten CEE countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The data is annual for a 
period of ten years between 2000 and 2009, and the BankCons and the Credit/Deposit 
are obtained from Beck et al. (2012) and the NPLs; the Gfc , the Export, the Exchrate, 
and the Unemp are obtained from the World Bank, CD-ROM 2010, and the FBanks is 
obtained from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The 
bank concentration is measured as the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total 
banking assets. The non-performing loans are measured as the non-performing loans to 
total gross loans. Instrumental and robustness check variables as the EBRD index, the 
BCap, Freedom, the Spread, the Stock, the Gdp, and the Fdi are obtained from Beck 
et al. (2012), the World Bank CD-ROM 2010, and the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD).
Figure 1 shows the NPLs ratio dynamics in the CEE countries for the last 10 years. 
Interestingly, the NPLs tend to move together in these countries, both in the recession 
and in the expansion period. The NPLs of these countries declined during 2000–2008, 
yet increased again after the global economic recession in 2008. Among others, Czech 
17 iΩ  can also be decomposed as 0 'i i i iΩ =Ω + Γ + Γ , where 0iΩ  is the contemporaneous covariance 
and iΓ  is a weighted sum of autocovariances. 
18 Their elements are 2 1/211, 11, 22,21,( / ) ,i i iiL = Ω −Ω Ω 12, 0,iL =  1/221, 21, 22,/ ,i i iL = Ω Ω   
and 1/222, 22,i iL = Ω .
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Republic, Bulgaria, and Slovakia had the highest NPLs ratio in 2000s, and by 2008, the 
NPLs ratio dropped to around five percent for all of the countries. Moving in the same 
direction in the last ten years shows that the NPLs ratio may not only depend on the 
internal factors but also the global factors, such as world economic growth, and global 
economic stability. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the NPLs, the bank concentration, and the 
selected instrumental and robustness check variables in the CEE countries. Both of the 
bank concentration and the NPLs are different among countries and there are wide dif-
ferences in terms of standard deviations. The average ratio of the NPLs is five percent 
and it is between one and eight percent; the average ratio of bank concentration is 
69 percent and it is between 54 and 95 percent. Selected instrumental and robustness 
check variables are also different among countries. Table 2 reports the cross correlations 
among the dependent, the explanatory, and the instrumental variables. Contrary to the 
expectations, there is a positive correlation between the NPLs and the BankCons. Cross 
correlations among the explanatory variables are less than % 80, indicating that the 
probability of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables is very low. 
Before proceeding to panel data analysis, unit root tests should be undertaken in order 
to check the stationary characteristics of the variables. The stationary properties of the 
panel data are tested with Levin et al. (2002, LLC) and Im et al. (2003, IPS) panel unit 
root tests, and it is found that all the variables are integrated of order zero at a differ-
ence in at least one test19. 
19 Results of the panel unit root tests are not reported to conserve space, but are available from the 
author upon request. 
Fig. 1. NPLs ratio dynamics in the CEE countries
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Dependent and independent variables
NPLs BankCons Gfc Export Exchrate Unemp Credit/Deposit FBanks
Bulgaria 0.04
(0.05)
0.58
(0.14)
0.12
(0.16)
0.05
(0.19)
–0.02
(0.09)
0.12
(0.05)
0.38
(0.25)
0.72
(0.03)
Croatia 0.07
(0.02)
0.60
(0.03)
0.07
(0.10)
0.04
(0.08)
–0.03
(0.09)
0.13
(0.04)
0.56
(0.14)
0.47
(0.05)
Czech Rep. 0.08
(0.08)
0.67
(0.12)
0.03
(0.05)
0.10
(0.09)
–0.05
(0.10)
0.07
(0.01)
0.40
(0.09)
0.74
(0.05)
Estonia 0.01
(0.02)
0.95
(0.04)
0.07
(0.18)
0.06
(0.13)
–0.02
(0.09)
0.09
(0.03)
0.64
(0.28)
0.72
(0.14)
Hungary 0.03
(0.01)
0.70
(0.12)
0.03
(0.05)
0.11
(0.07)
–0.01
(0.12)
0.07
(0.01)
0.46
(0.14)
0.71
(0.06)
Latvia 0.03
(0.05)
0.54
(0.03)
0.07
(0.19)
0.06
(0.09)
–0.01
(0.05)
0.11
(0.04)
0.55
(0.32)
0.50
(0.09)
Lithuania 0.05
(0.06)
0.80
(0.02)
0.05
(0.19)
0.09
(0.10)
–0.04
(0.06)
0.11
(0.04)
0.34
(0.22)
0.45
(0.09)
Poland 0.13
(0.06)
0.66
(0.12)
0.04
(0.09)
0.09
(0.09)
–0.02
(0.13)
0.15
(0.05)
0.31
(0.07)
0.78
(0.08)
Slovakia 0.06
(0.04)
0.80
(0.06)
0.04
(0.08)
0.10
(0.05)
–0.06
(0.10)
0.15
(0.04)
0.39
(0.07)
0.65
(0.09)
Slovenia 0.04
(0.02)
0.62
(0.08)
0.05
(0.04)
0.08
(0.05)
0.01
(0.10)
0.06
(0.01)
0.55
(0.21)
0.34
(0.09)
Average 0.05 0.69 0.06 0.08 –0.03 0.11 0.46 0.61
Robustness check and instrumental variables
Spread Gdp Stock Fdi EBRD Index BCap Freedom
Bulgaria 0.06
(0.01)
0.05
(0.04)
0.30
(0.38)
0.14
(0.09)
3.48
(0.30)
0.11
(0.03)
6.67
(0.68)
Croatia 0.09
(0.01)
0.03
(0.03)
0.45
(0.35)
0.06
(0.02)
3.80
(0.29)
0.11
(0.02)
6.29
(0.19)
Czech Rep. 0.04
(0.00)
0.03
(0.03)
0.29
(0.13)
0.06
(0.03)
3.81
(0.23)
0.06
(0.00)
6.95
(0.25)
Estonia 0.03
(0.01)
0.05
(0.08)
0.31
(0.05)
0.10
(0.05)
3.88
(0.15)
0.10
(0.02)
7.68
(0.16)
Hungary 0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.04)
0.27
(0.06)
0.15
(0.18)
4.00
(0.00)
0.09
(0.00)
7.22
(0.34)
Latvia 0.05
(0.02)
0.05
(0.09)
0.09
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
3.65
(0.30)
0.08
(0.00)
7.04
(0.24)
Lithuania 0.04
(0.02)
0.05
(0.07)
0.20
(0.08)
0.04
(0.02)
3.41
(0.32)
0.09
(0.01)
7.05
(0.44)
Poland 0.03
(0.03)
0.04
(0.02)
0.30
(0.17)
0.04
(0.01)
3.50
(0.21)
0.08
(0.01)
6.59
(0.35)
Slovakia 0.04
(0.02)
0.04
(0.05)
0.08
(0.01)
0.05
(0.04)
3.51
(0.26)
0.08
(0.02)
7.26
(0.53)
Slovenia 0.04
(0.01)
0.03
(0.04)
0.40
(0.37)
0.03
(0.02)
3.30
(0.00)
0.09
(0.01)
6.74
(0.13)
Average 0.05 0.04 0.27 0.07 3.63 0.09 6.95
Notes: Standard errors of the coefficients are shown in parentheses.
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4. Empirical results
The short-run effects of bank concentration on the non-performing loans are estimated 
with the pooled OLS, the GMM-system, and 2SLS estimates. The results are shown 
in Table 3. The pooled OLS regression shows that the bank concentration is not a sta-
tistically significant determinant of the NPLs. Since the pooled OLS is not an efficient 
panel data estimation technique, we also test the effect of bank concentration with the 
GMM-system and instrumental variable approaches. Three diagnostic test statistics are 
reported for the GMM-system estimation: (1) Wald test of joint significance, (2) Sargan 
Table 3. Panel data estimates
Pooled OLS (RE) GMM-system Instrumental variable (2SLS)
Constant –0.01** 
(2.41)
–0.00
(0.03)
–
D(NPLs (–1)) – 0.27***
(2.82)
0.23**
(2.27)
D(BankCons) 0.02
(0.57)
0.00
(0.22)
–0.00
(0.04)
D(Gfc) –0.05**
(2.36)
–0.03
(1.30)
–0.03
(1.18)
D(Export) –0.05
(1.45)
–0.03*
(1.80)
–0.02
(1.21)
D(Exchrate) 0.08***
(2.61)
0.05**
(1.94)
0.05**
(2.00)
D(Unemp) 0.27*
(1.14)
0.60***
(4.90)
0.51***
(3.41)
D(Credit/Deposit) 0.10***
(2.64)
0.04
(1.06)
0.04
(1.18)
D(FBanks) –0.02
(0.60)
0.06
(1.19)
0.01
(0.33)
F test 33.61*** – 12.48***
Hausman test 0.99 – –
Wald test – 228.27*** –
Sargan test – 0.13 0.23
Anderson canon. Corr. – – 0.02**
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) – 0.00 –
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.97 –
Notes: *, **, *** indicate a significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in brackets 
are the t-statistics. The Sargan test shows p-value for overidentification test of all instruments, the 
Anderson canon. Corr. test shows p-value for under identification test for the instruments, and AR(1), 
and AR(2) show p-values of Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests. The null hypothesis for AR(1) is that 
the first-differenced regression error term has no first-order serial correlation, and the null hypothesis 
for AR(2) is that the first-differenced regression error term has no second-order serial correlation. 
Instrumental variables in 2SLS: the EBRD index, the BCap, and the Freedom.
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(1958) test of overidentifying restrictions, and (3) for zero autocorrelation up to order 
two. The Wald test statistics indicate that the bank concentration, the NPLs, and the con-
trol macroeconomic variables are jointly significant at a 1% level in the GMM-system 
estimation. The Arellano-Bond (1991) test shows that the AR(1) test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation, and that the AR(2) test does not reject the 
null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation of residuals. The null hypothesis of 
the validity of the instruments set should be accepted based on the Sargan test. Accord-
ing to the GMM-system estimation, the bank concentration is not a statistically signifi-
cant determinant of the NPLs. For the 2SLS, two diagnostic test statistics are reported: 
(1) Sargan (1958) test of overidentifying restrictions, and (2) Anderson (1984) canonical 
correlation likelihood ratio test. The Sargan test fail to reject the null hypotheses that 
our instruments are valid (p-value 0.23), which supports the validity of the selected 
instruments as the EBRD Index, the BCap, and the Freedom. The Anderson canonical 
correlation test shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected indicating that the model 
is identified and the instruments are relevant. The 2SLS panel data model shows that the 
bank concentration is not a statistically significant determinant of the NPLs as t-value 
of the Bankcons is 0.04. Accordingly, all the short-run panel data models show that the 
bank concentration is an insignificant factor for the NPLs of CEE countries. 
Prior to FMOLS analysis, the long-run equilibrium relationship between the NPLs, the 
bank concentration, and the control macroeconomic variables should be tested with the 
panel cointegration analysis20. Table 4 reports both the within- and between-dimension 
panel cointegration test statistics. With the exception of the panel PP test, the other four 
test statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% significance level 
with a constant, and with the exception of the panel PP and the group ADF tests, the 
20 Panel cointegration is estimated with nonstationary (level series)* unlike short-run estimates (dif-
ferenced series). 
Table 4. Panel cointegration test
Test statisticsa With a constant No constant
Panel u-statistics 2.1006** 2.172**
Panel r-statistics –4.3317*** –3.7396***
Panel PP-statistics 1.3229 0.8530
Panel ADF-statistics – 2.2049**
Group r-statistics –5.4973*** –4.9143***
Group PP-statistics –15.3577*** –7.9258*
Group ADF-statistics – 0.6449
Notes: a Statistics are asymptotically distributed as normal. The panel u-test is right-sided, whereas the 
other tests are left-sided. *, **, *** indicate a significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Pedroni 
(1999, 2004) residual panel cointegration test is estimated within the BankCons, the NPLs, the Gfc, 
the Export, the Exchrate, the Unemp, the Credit/deposit, and the FBanks ratios. 
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other five test statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% signifi-
cance level without a constant21. Pedroni (2004) states that the panel ADF statistics have 
better small sample properties; therefore, our results are more reliable for the sample. 
Thus, following panel cointegration tests, we conclude that the NPLs, bank concentra-
tion, and the control macroeconomic variables are cointegrated for the CEE countries. 
Using the FMOLS, the long-run cointegrating coefficients should be estimated in order 
to find out the long-run relationship between the NPLs, the bank concentration, and the 
control macroeconomic variables.
Results for the panel group as well as the individual FMOLS estimators and t-statistics 
are reported in Table 5. For the panel group, the coefficient of the BankCons is not 
statistically significant, whereas the coefficients of the control macro-variables, such as 
21 Due to insufficient observations for a panel cointegration test with a constant, the panel ADF and 
the group ADF statistics cannot be estimated. 
Table 5. Panel FMOLS estimates
Countries BankCons Gfc Export Exchrate Unemp Credit/ Deposit FBanks
Bulgaria 0.06***
(9.25)
–0.08***
(14.47)
–0.01***
(2.98)
0.07***
(7.54)
0.39***
(4.31)
–0.12***
(4.90)
–0.32***
(6.99)
Croatia 0.11***
(24.29)
0.23***
(15.81)
–0.55***
(18.96)
–0.23***
(100.23)
1.06***
(109.80)
0.13***
(43.79)
–0.14***
(76.30)
Czech Rep. 0.59
(1.44)
2.45***
(8.21)
–1.46***
(7.89)
–3.27***
(8.69)
30.48***
(8.61)
2.48***
(9.04)
4.77***
(6.96)
Estonia –0.34***
(11.28)
0.02
(6.86)
0.01
(1.08)
0.07***
(18.05)
0.13***
(7.95)
0.02***
(8.08)
–0.06***
(9.40)
Hungary 0.02
(0.79)
0.04
(0.83)
–0.04
(0.91)
0.02
(0.59)
1.04**
(1.86)
0.05
(1.43)
–0.06
(0.52)
Latvia –0.29***
(3.83)
0.03
(1.32)
–0.02
(0.55)
0.12***
(3.07)
0.83***
(7.44)
0.04***
(7.77)
0.12***
(2.74)
Lithuania 0.86***
(10.43)
–0.27***
(11.83)
–0.40***
(9.95)
0.23***
(7.91)
–0.52***
(3.50)
–0.15***
(6.22)
–0.14***
(4.21)
Poland 0.29***
(3.03)
–0.26*
(1.85)
0.34***
(3.49)
0.06
(1.39)
0.88***
(3.17)
–0.16*
(1.68)
0.21*
(1.86)
Slovakia –0.24***
(6.86)
0.02
(0.49)
–0.11***
(6.75)
–0.08***
(5.33)
1.42***
(30.77)
0.32***
(6.34)
0.02
(0.35)
Slovenia 0.24***
(5.72)
0.22***
(2.62)
–0.21***
(4.77)
0.22***
(5.18)
1.16***
(2.92)
–0.01
(0.88)
0.05
(1.14)
Panel group –0.01
(0.43)
0.24***
(45.85)
–0.24***
(78.49)
–0.28***
(22.49)
3.61***
(52.08)
0.25***
(18.94)
–0.44***
(26.68)
Notes: *, **, *** indicate a significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in brackets 
are the t-statistics.
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the Gfc, the Export, the Exchrate, the Unemp, the Credit/Deposit, and the FBanks are 
statistically significant factors. The significance of the control macro-variables show that 
the long-run model is correctly established for the NPLs. Among others, the Unemp is 
the most important macroeconomic factor for the NPLs, and a one percentage increase 
in the unemployment rate increases NPLs by 3.61 percentage point for the panel group. 
The coefficients of the Gfc, the Unemp, and the Credit/Deposit are positive, whereas 
the coefficients of the Export, the Exchrate, and the FBanks are negative for the panel 
group. In contrast to theory explained in the methodology section, an increase in the 
Gfc results in an increase in NPLs. These findings need to be checked for individual 
countries. 
Although the coefficient of the BankCons is not a statistically significant factor for the 
panel group, the individual FMOLS results show that the bank concentration reduces 
the NPLs in Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia, and increases the NPLs in Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia. While countries on which the BankCons has a posi-
tive effect, a one percentage increase in bank concentration increases the NPLs by the 
range of 0.06–0.86 percentage points, the set of countries on which the BankCons has 
a negative effect, a one percentage increase in bank concentration reduces the NPLs 
by the range of 0.24–0.34 percentage points. This evidence reveals that the effect of 
bank concentration on the NPLs is ambiguous in the CEE countries. With regard to the 
control macroeconomic variables, the individual FMOLS results demonstrate that some 
of the individual variables are not statistically significant. The Gfc is not a statistically 
significant factor for Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia; the Export is not a statistically signifi-
cant factor for Estonia Hungary, and Latvia; the Exchrate is not a statistically significant 
factor for Hungary and Poland; the Credit/Deposit is not a statistically significant factor 
for Hungary, and Slovenia; and the FBanks is not a statistically significant factor for 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Among others, the Unemp is found to be the most important 
individual factor on the NPLs in the CEE countries. 
5. Robustness check
In order to test for the robustness of the results, we perform separate robustness check 
for the short-run and the long-run estimates. Three short-run robustness checks are 
shown in Table 6: (a) Firstly, we estimate the panel regression with a sub-sample period, 
from 2007 to 200922, in order to evaluate the effect of the global financial crises on the 
bank concentration-the NPLs relationship. Due to insufficient number of observations 
(N = 10, T = 3), this panel data is estimated with pooled OLS. Hausman (1978) test is 
accepted indicating that the panel data should be estimated with the fixed effect. Ac-
cording to the first robustness check, Wald test statistics reveal that the bank concentra-
tion, the NPLs, and the control macroeconomic variables are jointly significant at a 1% 
22 Global financial crises erupted in the middle of 2007 and reached the most devastating effects at 
the end of 2009. Most of the developed and developing countries experienced a recession during 
the global financial crises.
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Table 6. Robustness check of panel data estimates
Robustness 
check (a)
Robustness  
check (b)
Robustness 
check (c)
Robustness 
check (d)
Constant 0.01
(1.13)
–0.00
(0.63)
0.00
(0.05)
0.00
(0.05)
D(NPLs (–1)) – 0.25***
(2.88)
0.26***
(2.72)
0.27***
(2.87)
D(BankCons) –0.02
(0.0.65)
0.00
(0.14)
0.01
(0.41)
0.00
(0.24)
D(Gfc) –0.02
(1.08)
–0.00
(0.16)
–0.03
(1.56)
–0.02
(1.22)
D(Export) 0.00
(0.31)
–0.01
(0.94)
–0.03*
(1.78)
–0.02
(1.75)*
D(Exchrate) 0.01
(0.56)
0.04*
(1.82)
0.05**
(2.00)
0.04*
(1.83)
D(Unemp) 0.90***
(3.36)
0.40***
(3.15)
0.58***
(4.65)
0.61***
(4.92)
D(Credit/Deposit) –0.02
(0.21)
0.04
(1.10)
0.05
(1.25)
0.04
(0.99)
D(FBanks) 0.25*
(1.86)
0.07
(1.59)
0.06
(1.27)
0.06
(1.18)
D(Spread) – 0.17
(1.40)
– –
D(Gdp) – –0.21***
(2.87)
– –
D(Stocks) – – –0.03
(1.23)
–
D(Fdi) – – – 0.00
(0.28)
F test 16.73***
Wald test – 290.89*** 225.51*** 224.82***
Hausman test 0.00 – – –
Sargan test – 0.32 0.21 0.11
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(1)
– 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2)
– 0.96 0.92 0.98
Notes: This table reports robustness check for the short-run estimates. *, **, and *** indicate signifi-
cance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in brackets are the t-statistics. Robustness check 
(a) represents the estimation for the global crisis period 2007–2009, robustness check (b) represents 
the estimation with the additional control variables, namely the Spread (interest rate spread) and the 
Gdp (GDP growth), robustness check (c) represents the estimation with the additional control variable, 
namely the Stocks (stock market capitalisation / GDP ratio), and robustness check (d) represents the 
estimation with the additional control variable, namely the Fdi (foreign direct investment / GDP ratio).
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level in the sub-sample period. As was the case with the full-sample estimate, the bank 
concentration is not a statistically significant determinant of the NPLs. All of the control 
macroeconomic variables, except the Unemp and the FBanks, are also statistically insig-
nificant. In order to determine whether previous results are robust, we include additional 
control macroeconomic variables taken from the determinants of the NPLs literature, 
including, (b) the Spread, and the Gdp, (c) the Stock, and (d) the Fdi. According to these 
robustness checks, the GMM-system estimates show that bank concentration is not a 
statistically significant determinant of the NPLs. These robustness checks confirm that 
bank concentration does not affect the NPLs in the short-run. 
Table 7 shows the robustness check in the long-run. Additional control variables provide 
inconsistent results with the FMOLS; therefore, the robustness checks are performed 
with less control macroeconomic variables. When we exclude all of the control macro-
economic variables (a), the bank concentration is insignificant factor (t-value: 1.34) for 
the NPLs. When we add the Gfc, the Export, the Exchate (b), the Unemp, the Credit/
Deposit (c), the bank concentration is still insignificant factor (t-values: 0.40, and 0.21 
respectively) for the NPLs. Same as the short-run robustness results, the long-run ro-
bustness checks confirm that bank concentration does not affect the NPLs.
Table 7. Robustness check of panel FMOLS estimates
Robustness check (a) Robustness check (b) Robustness check (c)
BankCons 0.03
(1.34)
0.09
(0.40)
0.08
(0.21)
Gfc – –0.04***
(9.83)
0.03***
(2.94)
Export – –0.07***
(5.28)
–0.10***
(13.63)
Exchrate – 0.14***
(10.22)
–0.02***
(2.95)
Unemp – – 1.17***
(33.47)
Credit/ Deposit – – 0.08***
(20.56)
Notes: This table reports robustness check for the long-run estimates. Robustness check (a), (b) and 
(c) are the panel group FMOLS results with selected dependent variables. *, **, *** indicate a sig-
nificance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in brackets are the t-statistics.
Conclusions
In this paper, the relationship between bank concentration and the NPLs is investigated 
for ten CEE countries, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The major contribution of this paper 
is to explore the effects of bank concentration in the CEE countries both in the short- 
and long-run. Furthermore, the effect of bank concentration is tested not only for a 
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long-time period but also for the financial crises period. The short-run effect is tested 
with the GMM-system and the IV approaches, and the long-run effect is tested with 
the FMOLS approach. 
The empirical analysis shows that bank concentration is an insignificant factor on the 
NPLs, either in the short-run or in the long-run for the panel data set. On the other 
hand, individual FMOLS results show that the bank concentration reduces the NPLs in 
Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia, and increases the NPLs in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, 
Poland, and Slovenia. For positive effect, a one percentage increase in bank concentra-
tion increases the NPLs in the range of 0.06–0.86 percentage points, and for negative 
effect, a one percentage increase in bank concentration reduces the NPLs in the range 
of 0.24–0.34 percentage points. According to this evidence, the bank concentration in 
the banking sector does not mitigate the credit risk for all of the CEE countries. These 
findings are also robust enough controlling several factors, including the recent financial 
crises period and additional control variables. As a result, the relationship between the 
bank concentration and the NPLs, in regards to the CEE countries, is ambiguous.
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